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The concept of good faith has been a subject ofperennial controversy since it was derived from theRoman legal equivalent “bonas fides.” Juristic views
on and the legal conceptualization of the idea of good faith
may often vary across the cultural divides and legal
traditions. At a higher level of abstraction there may be a
semblance of understanding that it is a moral principle and
is reflective of all good senses such as honesty, good
conscience, fairness, equity, reasonableness, equitable
dealing or fair dealing, etc, but its application may cause
the divergence of opinions. This has caused some
uncertainty about the nature of the concept itself and the
consequent unpredictability of the outcome of its
application.
When focused on the content of good faith, the courts
in different countries as well as academic commentators
seem to be often baffled. Nor in the sources of the lex
mercatoria such as the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, the Principles of
European Contract Law, and the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG or the Vienna Sales Convention) can one
find a clear definition of the content of the notion of good
faith. In order to rationalise good faith jurists have
proffered various legal theories ranging from efficiency
arguments to formal entitlements in the spirit of solidarity
to its conceptualisation in a more specific sense as “a true
behavioural standard.” This dilemma pervades in
international law in general and in the emerging case law of
international investment law in particular. Therefore, it
proves the international arbitrator’s task in an investment
dispute all the more difficult as in any other field when it
comes to define the concept and to render any decision on
the basis of it.
It thus merits a fresh look at the concept of good faith in
order to understand its scope and function in a contractual
relationship which is the focus of this article. In order to
apply the concept to a particular context, good faith could
be considered a functional or objective one in the sense of
a framework of relationship between the parties to a
contract and cooperation being its underlying current. In
this respect good faith is a framework concept based on
cooperation as its philosophical foundation. In
international business-contracting the consideration of
mutual interests of the contracting parties in the spirit of
cooperative dealing seems to get favour in some quarters as
a manifestation of modern trend of collectivism as opposed
to the nineteenth century legacy of individualism.
Farnsworth, however, observes:
“Good faith performance has always required the cooperation
of one party where it was necessary in order that the other
might secure the expected benefits of the contract. And the
standard for determining what cooperation was required has
always been an objective standard, based on the decency,
fairness or reasonableness of the community and not on the
individual’s own beliefs as to what might be decent, fair or
reasonable. Both common sense and tradition dictate an
objective standard for good faith performance” (E Allan
Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U
CHI L REV 666 (1963)).
It needs to be stressed that cooperation should not be
understood in the sense of familial relationship such as
motherly love or brotherly affections, but must be
confined to the contractual relationship, hence the notion
of good faith as a framework concept, ie fidelity to the
bargain, as mentioned earlier. As far as the content of good
faith is concerned the focus has to be specific in a
particular context concerned in the contractual
framework to see if the parties have acted in the spirit of
cooperation, ie good faith cooperation (see L Carvajal-
Arenas, ‘Good Faith in the Lex Mercatoria: An Analysis of
Arbitral Practice and Major Western Legal Systems (PhD
Thesis, University of Portsmouth, 2011)). In numerous
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domestic court decisions (eg United Group Rail Services
Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2009] NSWCA
177: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/
NSWCA/2009/177.html and see also relevant cases
mentioned therein)) and in international judicial (eg the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases (ICJ): http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/52/5561.pdf), and arbitral decisions
(eg Wintershall v Qatar (1990) 15 Yb Comm Arb’n 30,
Mechema Ltd (England) v SA Mines, Minérais et Métaux (MMM)
(Belgium) (1982) 7 Yb Comm Arb’n 77) there seems to be
a tendency to give weight to the context in which the
concept is to be meant. Article 31 (1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties also points out the
importance of the context of the terms of the treaty while
interpreting it in good faith. Therefore, the content of the
concept of good faith is more of a contextual nature than
the concept itself understood in the abstract sense.
The International Court of Justice observed: “(t)he
principle of good faith is ‘one of the basic principles
governing the creation and performance of legal
obligations’; it is not in itself a source of obligation where
none would otherwise exist” (ICJ, Border and Transborder
Armed Actions Case (Nicaragua v Honduras), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, judgment December 20, 1988, ICJ Rep 69,
at 105 (1988)).
One may thus wonder if good faith can be understood in
two senses, viz, “macro good faith” and “micro good
faith.” In respect of the former the abstract notion of good
faith in the sense of honesty, fairness, reasonableness
signifying its subjectivity may be meant, ie “macro good
faith” – a horizontal approach, a layer of idea which is
generic (ie an idea at a higher level of abstraction) and may
not be understood the same in different factual patterns as
it will depend on its application to them. Thus, from the
notional point of view good faith in the macro sense is
considered to act as a major interpretative principle.
While, on the other hand, it should be appreciated that
what appears to be good faith in one context may not
appear the same in another context with a different pattern
of facts, situations or surrounding circumstances. Thus, the
notion of good faith focusing on the particular context
concerned – ie the vertical approach – may be understood
as “micro good faith” which brings with it the sense of
objectivity rather than subjectivity understood in the
horizontal sense, ie “macro good faith.”
It should be appreciated that the pacta sunt servanda
principle, being the foundation of all contracts, is the
manifestation of “macro good faith.” But “micro good
faith” being applied in specific factual contexts may limit
the application of the pacta sunt servanda principle in order
to conform to it, even in changed circumstances that affect
the contract (see A F M Maniruzzaman, “State Contracts
with Aliens – The Question of Unilateral Change by the
State in Contemporary International Law” (1992) 9 J Int’l
Arb 141; Detlev Vagts, “Essays in Honor of Oscar
Schachter, Rebus Revisited. Changed Circumstances in
Treaty Law,” 43 Columbia J Trans L (2005), 459).
Therefore, the pacta sunt servanda principle in a contractual
relationship may not be applied as an incantation or in the
abstract sense, rather it should be assessed in terms of
“micro good faith.”
The above conceptual paradigm may be termed as the
“badge of good faith” and can be shown diagrammatically
as follows. In the diagram (see above) “macro good faith”
represents as a concept at a higher level of abstraction
which sits horizontally and underneath it goes down
“micro good faith” as a functional or objective concept
which is particularly pointed with its two arms –
“cooperation” as the underlying current and “context” as
the target beam – to a focused issue in respect of which
good faith is questioned. Thus, depending on whether
good faith exists or not in respect of a particular issue, the
“badge of good faith” can operate as a thinking process and
can determine itself the worthy place where it belongs ( ie
to certify the existence of good faith).
In international investment law, substantive standards of
treatment (investment treaty provisions) such as fair and
equitable treatment, full protection and security,
protection of legitimate expectation, transparency, non-
discrimination, national treatment and most favoured
national treatment, are considered fundamentally based on
good faith, or manifestations or corollaries of good faith,
but their content depends on the specific contexts in which
they are applied. Here comes the crunch point when one
asks: even if a state literally complies with the foregoing
standards in respective cases, will it be always considered to
have acted in good faith in its relationship to the other
contracting party? Inversely, if a state acts in good faith to
comply with its non-investment international treaty
obligations relating to human rights, the environment or 17
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climate change that may interfere with investors’ rights,
will it be implicated in bad faith vis-à-vis the foreign
investors? It is difficult to give any straightforward answers
to these questions. The answers, however, may be found
specifically in the contexts in which the notion of good
faith is to be examined. In investment arbitration
jurisprudence such a contextual extrapolation seems to be
increasingly endorsed rather than the simple meaning
attributed to a standard of treatment: see for example the
S D Myers (S D Myers, Inc v Government of Canada (2000),
partial award: http://italaw.com/documents/ SDMeyers-
1stPartialAward.pdf;); Mondev (Mondev Int’l Ltd v USA:
http://italaw.com/documents/Mondev-Final.pdf0; ADF
(ADF Group Inc and USA (2003): http://italaw.com/
documents/ADF-award_000.pdf); Loewen (The Loewen
Group, Inc and Raymond L Loewen v USA (2003):
http://italaw.com/documents/Loewen-Award-2.pdf); and
Waste Management ( Waste Management, Inc v United Mexican
States: http://italaw.com/documents/laudo_ingles.pdf).
Often, in order to reflect good-faith cooperation in an
investment contract situation the aforementioned standards
of treatment for foreign investors may have to be weighed
against the state party’s competing public interests, such as
the protection of the environment, the promotion and
protection of human rights and the securing of the
economic development of the host country. There seems to
be a growing support for such a stance amongst various
stakeholders such as host countries, NGOs, international
organisations (the World Bank and the IMF, etc.) and
others, though this aspect of international investment law is
still in the early stage of development.
The scope and content of the standards of treatment for
foreign investors may differ from contexts to contexts
entailing the understanding of good faith in the micro
sense. As the comments to section 205 of the UCC also
states, in a different domain of law though, that “[t]he
phrase ‘good faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its
meaning varies somewhat with the context.” To get a result
then it would be advisable to look at the notion of “micro
good faith” – a context-based one with the objectivity that
underscores the framework of relationship, cooperation
being its philosophical foundation. Good faith in a
particular situation should thus be understood not as an
abstract concept but as a functional or objective one, i.e. in
the micro sense, covering all stages of a contract. This
micro approach to good faith may help us solve major
problems or disputes, as the adage goes: “good things come
in small packages.”
If the above conceptual clarification of good faith bears
some value, its relevance will not only be in international
investment law but also in international law (in general)
and other branches of international law and, above all, in
domestic laws.
• An earlier version of this article has been published in
Kluwer Abitration Blog.
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